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The United Nations' Paradox: The Battle between
Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty
INTRODUCTION
There seems no greater conflict in the international realm as
the one that exists between humanitarian intervention and the
notion of sovereignty that every state so strongly embraces. The
idea that every state is entitled to autonomous control over its
domestic affairs is in a constant struggle with the belief that all
individuals have an inherent right to basic freedoms that should
never be imperiled. The debate especially erupts when it comes to
the United Nations' (UN) intervention into nations for humanitar-
ian purposes. Questions concerning the UN's legal right to inter-
vene into sovereign nations pervade the international sphere, as
nations try to define the UN's role and the extent of its power.
Part One of this comment briefly discusses the historical devel-
opment of the UN Charter and its human rights provisions, as
well as the sovereignty provisions contained therein. Part Two
explores the legal debate that exists between the anti-
interventionists and those who support humanitarian interven-
tion. Part Three examines briefly four case studies in which in-
tervention is justified by humanitarian purposes -- Iraq, Somalia,
Haiti, and Rwanda. Part Four analyzes the basis of the problem,
how the problem may be reconciled, and the future of this debate
between humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty. This
comment concludes that the problem that exists between interven-
tion and state sovereignty is one that exists because of inconsis-
tent principles set forth in the UN Charter and inconsistent appli-
cations of these provisions. This comment proposes amending the
UN Charter to provide clarity to the provisions that are the cul-
prits to the debate, as well as proposes a system of checks on the
UN. Once the UN Charter is examined and necessary revamps
are in place to resolve issues and confusion, the debate may very
well still exist, but on a much smaller scale. If the inconsistencies
within the Charter continue to exist, the UN risks losing credibil-
ity within the international realm.
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I. HISTORY OF THE UN CHARTER AND THE CONTRADICTORY
PROVISIONS
A. History
The UN was conceptualized as a result of World War II, as a
growing international desire for peace and cooperation among na-
tions developed. The UN and its Charter were the fruits of the
1943 Declaration of Four Nations on General Security.! The idea
was to bring together four major forces -- the United States, Great
Britain, the Soviet Union, and China -- in an attempt to form an
international organization to promote international peace and to
prevent future atrocities as those experienced in the World Wars.
The next year, the proposals to establish the new organization,
commonly referred to as the "Dumbarton Oaks proposals," were
brought to the discussion table, soon to become the foundation of
the UN Charter. In the proposals, the four powers established
that the purpose of the organization was to prohibit "the threat or
use of force by states against other states."5 They also agreed to a
Security Council whose primary function was to "maintain inter-
national peace and security" and that it could use forcible meas-
ures to do so if the Security Council determined that peace and
security were disrupted.' The four powers and representatives
from approximately 46 other nations converged to adopt the final
proposal in San Francisco in the spring of 1945 and soon thereaf-
ter, on October 24, 1945, the UN, under the auspices of the UN
Charter, was born.7
1. SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN
EVOLVING WORLD ORDER, 65 (Procedural Aspects of International Law Series, Vol. 21,
1996).
2. Id. at 66.
3. Id. See also Frederick J. Petersen, Note, The Favade of Humanitarian Intervention
for Human Rights in a Community of Sovereign Nations, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 871,
875-76 (1998). (Petersen states that not only were the World Wars key factors in the for-
mation of the UN but the failure of the League of Nations was also a catalyst in the forma-
tion).
4. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 66.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 67. The UN Charter was signed on June 26, 1945 by 50 countries and Po-
land, who was not present at the conference, signed it shortly thereafter making the origi-
nal number of signatories 51. The United Nations, About the United Nations! History, at
http://www.un.org/aboutun/history.htm (last visited April 1, 2002). The United Nations officially
came into existence on October 24, 1945. Id. See also RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 1940-1945, 964 (Jeannette E. Muther,
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B. The UN's Right to Intervene, Human Rights - Charter Provi-
sions
In the aftermath of World War II, the primary goal of the UN,
as a collective entity, was to maintain international peace and se-
curity, while respecting national sovereignty.8 It did this through
several provisions of the Charter, which lay the foundation to
maintain the international balance of power. Article 2(4) of the
Charter provides the basic prohibition on the use of force against
another: "All Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integ-
rity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."9
There are, however, two basic exceptions to this prohibition.' °
The first prohibition can be found in Article 51 of the Charter,
which permits "individual or collective self-defense" in the event
an attack occurs on a Member state.11 The second exception to the
prohibition of force is the equally popular Article 39 (Chapter VII)
of the Charter, which authorizes the Security Council, in deter-
mining if there is any breach or threat to peace, to take action that
it deems necessary to secure the peace. 2 Article 42 extends the
Security Council's power by permitting the Security Council to
authorize the use of force to "maintain or restore international
peace and security."3 The use of force is generally discouraged
asst., The Brookings Institution 1958) (giving in-depth coverage of the formation of the UN
Charter)
8. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 70.
9. UN CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
10. Christopher C. Joyner & Anthony Clark Arend, Anticipatory Humanitarian Inter-
vention: An Emerging Legal Norm?, 10 USAFA J. Leg. Stud. 27, 29 (1999/2000).
11. UN CHARTER art. 51. Article 51 of the UN Charter reads:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collec-
tive self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise in the exercise
of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Id.
12. UN CHARTER art. 39. Article 39 of the UN Charter reads, "The Security Council
shall determine the existence of any threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres-
sion and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accor-
dance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." Id.
13. UN CHARTER art. 42. Article 42 of the UN Charter reads:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or
393
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within the UN; however, the Security Council retains great power
with respect to the use of force under this provision.
The Charter also includes several provisions concerning the pro-
motion of human rights. The human rights provisions that were
adopted into the Charter were a result of the efforts of many
organizations that lobbied during the 1945 San Francisco Confer-
ence for human rights protections to be included as a major part of
the Charter.14 The Preamble of the Charter includes a provision
which states that the members of the UN are "determined to reaf-
firm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth
of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of
nations large and small."15 The Charter also states as one of the
UN's purposes the promotion of "respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion."" Along with various sections of the UN
Charter that mention the promotion and maintenance of "human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all," Article 55 of the UN
Charter re-emphasizes that all Members must recognize a "uni-
versal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
mental freedom for all" and Article 56 makes it a mandatory re-
sponsibility of the Members to carry out these human rights pro-
tections. 7
On the other hand, the Charter, seemingly in conflict with itself,
also recognizes the very important concept of state sovereignty.
Article 2(7) of the Charter provides,
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and secu-
rity. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air,
sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
Id.
14. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 69.
15. UN CHARTER Preamble.
16. UN CHARTER art. 1, para. 3. The UN Charter, Article 1, Paragraph 3 reads, "[The
Purposes of the United Nations are:] To achieve international cooperation in solving inter-
national problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in pro-
moting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Id.
17. UN CHARTER art. 55 and 56. There are additional sections of the UN Charter
which touch upon human rights in some manner - Chapter IV grants the General Assem-
bly the power to make recommendations to assist "in the realization of human rights and
fundamental freedoms..." UN CHARTER art. 13, para. 1. Chapter X of the Charter grants
the Economic and Social Council the power to "make recommendations for the purpose of
promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all."
UN CHARTER art. 62, para.2. See also MURPHY, supra note 1, at 69-82.
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within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require
the Members to submit such matter to settlement under the
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the ap-
plication of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.18
It is easy to see where the conflict arises. On the one hand, the
Charter provides for human rights protections and in the event
that international peace and security is threatened, the Security
Council maintains the power to use force as it deems necessary.
On the other hand, states do not want their autonomy infringed
upon. There remains no definitive answer to the UN's role, and
from this uncertainty stems much legal debate.
II. THE LEGAL DEBATE
The crux of the debate centers on whether the UN is permitted
to intervene within a sovereign state in the event of humanitarian
crisis and whether international law provides the vehicle for such
intervention. 9 Opponents, and advocates, alike, base their argu-
ments primarily on the UN Charter and its seemingly conflicting
provisions.
Those opposed to intervention by the UN ("anti-
interventionists") thrust their argument by specific Charter provi-
sions, and lack thereof These anti-interventionists argue that the
principle of humanitarian intervention, which was a well-known
proposition at the time the UN's inception, "was not expressly
provided for in the Charter in the matter of interstate relations."2"
They further contend that two provisions of the Charter make it
very difficult to believe that international law would provide any
vehicle for UN intervention.21 First, they argue that all member
states, through Article 2(4), renounce "the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state," with the exception of self-defense.22 Second, the anti-
interventionists lean on Article 2(7) of the Charter, which provides
that the UN is not legally permitted to engage in the affairs
18. UN CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
19. T. Modibo Ocran, The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of Robust
Peacekeeping, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (2002).
20. Id. at 17.
21. Id. at 16-17.
22. Id. See also supra text accompanying note 9.
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"which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state."23
Anti-interventionists also support their position with the 1970
Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter. In that Declaration, the General Assembly re-
affirmed to the individual states that they have "a duty not to in-
tervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, or
to disrupt the territorial, or political integrity of another state, in
accordance with the Charter."2 4  More importantly, non-
interventionists extend their legal argument by relying on judg-
ments of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which have con-
firmed the sacredness of sovereignty - a sacredness, they believe,
that is deeply grounded in custom. In 1986, the ICJ, in Nicaragua
v. United States, expressed, "the principle of non-intervention in-
volves the right of every sovereign state to conduct its affairs
without outside interference.. .it is part and parcel of customary
international law."
25
The anti-interventionists assert that there is no place in inter-
national law for UN humanitarian interventions, as the sover-
eignty of the state must be respected to the utmost. This position
is supported by provisions of the Charter, UN General Assembly
23. Ocran, supra note 19, at 17; see also supra text accompanying note 18.
24. The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N.
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp No. 18, at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970). The Declaration of Princi-
ples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter was a product of the twenty-fifth (25 h) anniversary of the UN
Charter. Id. at 121. The goal was to "contribute to the strengthening of world peace and
constitute a landmark in the development of international law and of relations among
states by promoting.. .the universal application of the principles embodied in the Charter."
Id. The Declaration reiterates the general propositions set forth in the Charter, re-
emphasizing the duty that nations owe to one another to respect and protect sovereignty
and the peoples of fellow nations. Id. at 121-123. See also Ocran, supra note 19, at 14.
25. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 106 (June
27). The Nicaragua Case, which does not concern intervention for humanitarian purposes,
focuses, rather, on whether the United States was justified, by invoking the Charter (Arti-
cle 51), in its self-proclaimed "self-defense" act against Nicaragua. Id. In its discussion of
whether the United States was justified, the International Court of Justice reiterates the
importance respecting the sovereignty of other nations. Id. The International Court of
Justice found, in the end, that the United States had not justified its attack on Nicaragua
as a self-defense mechanism and had therefore, "breached its obligation under customary
international law not to use force against another state, not to intervene in its affairs, not
to violate its sovereignty, and not to interrupt peaceful maritime commerce." Id. at 147.
The Court then ordered the United States "to cease and refrain from all such acts as may
constitute breaches of the foregoing legal obligations." Id. at 149. See also Ocran, supra
note 19, at 14-15.
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Declarations, as well as by continual condemnation of states to
interfere in the domestic affairs of other states.
On the other side of the table, there certainly is no lack of sup-
port for humanitarian intervention. Those who support UN hu-
manitarian intervention ("interventionists") believe that the UN
Charter, specifically Article 2(7) of the Charter, has "never been
interpreted by the General Assembly and the Security Council as
preventing action by the UN in serious cases of human rights vio-
lations."26 Further, some believe that a careful reading of Article
2(4) shows that "the prohibition is not against coercion per se, but
rather the use of force for unlawful purposes," which in effect does
not rule out intervention for humanitarian purposes.27
In addition to interpreting these provisions in their own light,
interventionists also point to specific Charter provisions that not
only provide for human rights protections, but make it a require-
ment that all member states conform.2' The reasoning stems from
the belief that the Charter, a result of the atrocities of World War
II, "left no doubt as to the intimate nexus that the framers per-
ceived to link international peace and security and the most fun-
damental human rights of all individuals."29  The interventionists
emphasize Article 55 of the Charter as giving the member states
specific responsibilities with regard to the "universal observance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms."" In addition, Article
56 furthers member's responsibility by calling upon them to "take
joint and separate action in cooperation with the UN for the
achievement of the purposes set out in Article 55. ' 1
The Charter provisions concerning human rights are further ex-
tended by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was
adopted by the General Assembly in December 1948.32 The Decla-
ration provides an array of "civil and political rights and economic,
social and cultural rights pertinent to human existence" and basi-
cally sets forth standards for human rights protections.33 In coop-
26. Ocran, supra note 19, at 17; see also supra text accompanying note 18.
27. Ocran, supra note 19, at 20. (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 21.
29. Id. at 20-21.
30. UN CHARTER art. 55; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text. See also
Ocran, supra note 19 at 21.
31. UN CHARTER art. 56; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
32. FRANCIS KOFI ABIEW, THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF
HuMNITARIAN INTERVENTION, 76 (1999).
33. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc.
GAIRES/217A (1948). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the
General Assembly on December 10, 1948. Id. The Declaration calls for the recognition of
Winter 2003
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eration with the Declaration, the human rights sections of the
Charter certainly do make it appear as if the drafters meant the
Charter to be a vehicle for a collective arrangement for the protec-
tion of human rights.
Interventionists agree that sovereignty certainly is a legal norm
falling within the bounds of international law; however, they
claim, humanitarian intervention has also been recognized as cus-
tom in some circles. In the same year that the Declaration of
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter
reiterated respect for sovereignty, the International Law Associa-
tion expressed to the International Commission on Human Rights
that "the doctrine of humanitarian intervention appears to have
been so clearly established under customary international law
that only its limits and not its existence is subject to debate." 4
The interventionist school certainly is not without support in
fighting the battle against sovereignty. Their argument, too, rests
upon Charter provisions, Declarations, as well as some believe,
customary international law. Human rights violations, they per-
ceive, are a threat to international peace and security and the Se-
curity Council can authorize intervention in order to restore this
international peace and security. Most persuasive for the inter-
ventionists is the fact that humanitarian interventions have, in-
deed, been authorized by the Security Council, thus lending to the
"legality" of such actions. In recent years, the UN has passed
Resolutions providing for intervention for stated humanitarian
purposes, but certainly never without much debate.
III. UN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS - CASE STUDIES
A. Iraq - 1991
The Security Council passed Resolution 688 in response to Iraqi
repression of many of its own nationals, mainly the Kurdish in-
"inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." Id. It states that re-
spect for human rights is "essential to promote the development of friendly relations be-
tween nations." Id. It calls upon all Member nations to "cause it [the Declaration] to be
disseminated, displayed, read, and expounded principally in schools and other educational
institutions, without distinction based on the political status of countries or territories." Id.
See also Abiew, supra, note 32, at 76-77.
34. International Law Association, The International Protection of Human Rights by
General International Law, in INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON HuMAN RIGHTS, INTERIM
REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITEE 11 (1970). See also Ocran, supra note 19, at 14.
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habitants.35 The mistreatment of the Kurds was found to be a
"threat to international peace and security," which prompted the
Security Council to authorize the use of force. 36  The "threat to
peace and security" came as a result of the mass departure of
Kurdish nationals into the neighboring countries. 7
Resolution 688 demanded that Iraq "cease its repressive acts
and permit immediate access by international relief organizations
to persons in need of assistance. ,3 8 However, the Resolution was
not unlimited in its scope concerning the UN's power to enforce its
demands. 39 The Resolution contained no mention of Chapter VII
of the Charter, which authorizes the Security Council to use force-
ful intervention, nor does it mention any "collective enforcement
measures."0 The intervention was to be made by UN forces that
would enter the area "to create safe havens for Kurds and to au-
thorize military measures by allied forces."'" Doubts are easily
cast upon the legality of such measures since acts of force were not
mentioned in the Resolution.42
The purpose of the intervention was not to remedy the internal
violations of human rights, but rather it was the external effects of
the Iraqi tyranny and this arguably is the first time the transbor-
der effect of human rights violations was considered grounds for
UN intervention.43 The Resolution had precedential worth be-
cause "this was the first time that the [Security] Council had
characterized severe human rights deprivations having minimal
external effects as a threat to international peace and security."4
35. Richard B. Lillich, Article,: The Role of the UN Security Council in Protecting Hu-
man Rights in Crisis Situations: UN Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War
World, 3 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 6 (1995).
36. Id. Lillich makes note that Resolution 688 merely implied "a reference to UN Char-
ter, Chapter VII" by using the words "threat to international peace and security," and later
explains that Chapter VII is never directly mentioned in the Resolution. Id.
37. Id. The Resolution stated that "Iraq's actions led to a massive flow of refugees
towards and across international frontiers and to cross-border incursions, which threaten
international peace and security in the region." Id. A war in the region immediately prior
to the situation in Iraq was also a catalyst in the Security Council's actions as the tensions
in the area "increased the potential for regional instability." Ruth E. Gordon, Humanitar-
ian Intervention by the United Nations: Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti, 31 TEX. INT'L. L. J. 43, 49
(1996).
38. Lillich, supra note 35, at 6.
39. Gordon, supra note 37, at 49.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 50.
43. Id. at 49.
44. Lillich, supra note 35, at 7.
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The dispute over humanitarian intervention and state sover-
eignty peaked with Resolution 688. Iraq was its own sovereign,
complete with a "single, functioning government," leading many
states to question the legality of UN humanitarian intervention.45
The Resolution, however, contemplated the debate as it does reit-
erate the notion of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and Article
2(7).46 The drafters of the Resolution were well aware of the issues
and carefully constructed it to balance the ends of the delicate de-
bate.
B. Somalia - 1992
In December 1992, Resolution 794 became a central validating
device for the Security Council's power as it provided prime justi-
fication for UN humanitarian intervention. 7 After determining
that "the magnitude of the human rights tragedy caused by the
conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being
created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constituted
a threat to international peace and security," the Security Council
decided that intervention was necessary. 48 Unlike the interven-
tion in Iraq, the Security Council specifically put Chapter VII of
the Charter into full effect when it "authorized both the Secretary-
General and cooperating Member States 'to use all necessary
means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.""'9
"Regional instability" was the Security Council's justification for
its intervention in Somalia, but it was Somalia's internal human
rights violations that were the actual reasons for the Security
Council's use of force.5" The crisis responded to in Somalia was
completely within the boundaries of Somalia, unlike Iraq where
the UN acted in response to regional instability due to refugee
overflows.5 In unprecedented action, the Security Council held
that solely internal human rights violations justified forceful in-
tervention. The internal crisis in Somalia was enough to be con-
45. Gordon, supra note 37, at 50.
46. Id.
47. Lillich, supra note 35, at 7.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Gordon, supra note 37, at 51.
51. Id.
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sidered "a threat to international peace, despite the absence of
transboundary impact."52
As evidenced by its actions in Iraq and Somalia, the Security
Council has justified its use of force by determining that threats
to international peace can exist when there is regional instability
as well as purely internal instability, when both "produce severe
and widespread human rights deprivations."" The latter being a
landmark in the "legality and legitimacy of humanitarian inter-
vention."'
C. Haiti - 1994
The UN pushed the envelope once again when drafting UN
Resolution 940. It stretched even further the fine line of defining
a "threat to international peace and security." The Resolution was
a response to Haiti's state of political affairs and the effect of such
affairs on the declining social order, civil liberties violations, and
refugee flows.55 The Security Council justified its action to remedy
"significant further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in
Haiti."5" The Security Council saw the military government that
was in place in Haiti as a threat to peace and security in the re-
gion and authorized the use of force.57 The Resolution demanded
"the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the
restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of
Haiti."
5 8
Naturally, this action prompted discussion. Some argue that
Resolution 940 authorized the "purest [form of] humanitarian in-
tervention to date" while others argue that it was not humanitar-
ian at all, because of its purely political agenda.59 Resolution 940
represents, once again, a significant precedent for UN-authorized
humanitarian intervention -- not only because of the great success
of the mission, but because of the effect that it had on the ad-
vancement of defining UN humanitarian intervention. "When
52. Id.
53. Lillich, supra note 35, at 8.
54. Gordon, supra note 37, at 51.
55. Id. at 52.
56. Lillich, supra note 35, at 10.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 9. Lillich claims that the situation in Haiti presented the UN with "the pur-
est [form of] humanitarian intervention to date." Id. Gordon, on the other hand argues that
the situation was not humanitarian at all because the primary agenda was to restore a
legitimate government. Gordon, supra note 37, at 52-3.
Winter 2003
Duquesne Law Review
there is political will, the UN possesses all the authority it needs
to protect human rights in crisis situations."60
D. Rwanda - 1994
Rwanda exemplifies quite a different situation than Iraq, Soma-
lia, and Haiti in the evolution of UN intervention. In Rwanda,
even though civil conflict abounded and genocide was widespread,
making it a "classic case for... intervention," the UN did not take
forcible action to prevent further atrocities.6' Resolution 918
called for aid to displaced refugees and civilians and the "creation
and maintenance of secure humanitarian relief operations.6
However, no UN troops were ever deployed, one reason "being that
member states made no commitments to provide the requisite
number of troops for such an undertaking."63 The reason for the
lack of support is unknown; however, speculation centers on the
intervention possibly resulting in great loss for the UN members
committing troops - a risk they were not willing to take for rea-
sons thought to be outside of the interests of those UN members. 64
Ultimately, France, which had historical ties to Rwanda, unilat-
erally undertook the responsibility of intervening." France de-
cided, two months into the mission, that the greatest remedy that
they could provide would be the "setting up of a security zone in
southwestern Rwanda and ultimately handed over the task to UN
peacekeeping forces composed of African units."66
These four case studies are not the only humanitarian interven-
tions that have occurred, but certainly they paint a picture of the
diversity that exists when defining humanitarian efforts and the
Security Council's legitimacy in utilizing its power under Chapter
VII, when interfering with the sovereignty of states. The variety
of the situations may provide us with little understanding of the
UN's rationale to intervene or not to intervene, or even its actual
"legal" power to intervene, but, most importantly, this diversity
illustrates the legal debate and the need for clarification of the
UN's role.
60. Lillich, supra note 35, at 11.
61. Gordon, supra note 37, at 55.
62. ABIEW, supra, note 32, at 193.
63. Id.
64. Gordon, supra note 37, at 55.
65. ABIEW, supra, note 32, at 194.
66. Id.
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IV. THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM & THE FUTURE OF UN
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
A. The Root of the Problem
It is well established that opinion is divided when it comes to
the legality of UN intervention for humanitarian purposes. Before
speculating into the future of humanitarian interventions and the
UN, a consideration of proposed core problems, complete with
suggested solutions is necessary.
Provisions within the Charter, which seemingly conflict with
each other, are an obvious problem in the face of this debate. Is
the UN supposed to always ignore the stated humanitarian re-
sponsibilities as set forth in the Charter for the respect of territo-
rial integrity, also set forth in the Charter? Perhaps it is time for
the Charter to be revamped to include additional provisions and
more definitive statements as to the legality of interventions.
The problem primarily is a "definitional" one. Definitional prob-
lems that arise are clearly illustrated by the four case studies
above. We see in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda a myriad of
situations in which "threat to international peace and security"
and "humanitarian intervention" are defined differently. UN
members need to convene for consensus on the definition of
"threat to international peace and security." It is this threat that
grants the Security Council power to authorize intervention. With
a more settled definition, it would be easier to know when the UN
is "legally" authorized to intervene - even for humanitarian pur-
poses. Once it has been determined that there has been a threat
to the international peace, then it will make it a far easier task to
determine how far the UN can stretch its arm into the sovereignty
of a state for humanitarian purposes.
On that note, there exists no single definition of "humanitarian
intervention," and it has proven to be difficult to define because of
the many faces it has exemplified. Traditionally, it referred more
to "forcible interventions designed to stem large-scale human-
rights crises." 7 However, the term has come to include "interven-
tions launched to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance
to severely deprived populations.'8
67. Gordon, supra note 37, at 44.
68. Id. at 44-45.
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The following all-encompassing definition of humanitarian in-
tervention is used often throughout the international community:
"Humanitarian intervention is the threat or use of force by a state,
group of states, or international organization primarily for the
purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from wide-
spread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights."9
This definition, itself, is not set in stone and still leaves room for
much interpretation - it may not be so clear what is meant by
"primarily" and "widespread deprivations of internationally recog-
nized human rights." Sean D. Murphy, author and Professor of
International Law at George Washington University, explains,
"Those skeptical of the legality and legitimacy of UN humanitar-
ian intervention will prefer greater clarity regarding the type and
level of human rights violations that justify such actions.""
Another clarity problem stems from the fact that human rights
are mentioned quite frequently in the Charter, but unfortunately,
there has not yet been any system established to accomplish hu-
manitarian goals.7' The Charter simply states that members have
a responsibility to promote human rights.72 "Promote" could po-
tentially be defined in many ways -- some countries may define it
to include intervention and others may not; therefore, there are
inconsistencies among the states on how or when it is appropriate
for them to act.73 In order to give human rights protection the at-
tention it needs to survive, there needs to be more consistency and
less confusion among member states.
There are also support and cohesion concerns among the mem-
bers that make humanitarian intervention the hot debate that it
is. In addition to the definitional problems of the UN Charter, UN
members are often not willing to put forth the military units and
the time devotion necessary for large humanitarian interven-
tions.74 A reason for this being that there is little advantage to the
member state in return for the potential loss of lives they may in-
cur.75 The case study of Rwanda provides a prime example of this
lack of support among UN members. Professor Murphy refers to
this problem as "the schizophrenia" of UN member states, "par-
69. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 11-12.
70. Id. at 324.
71. Petersen, supra note 3, at 878.
72. Id. at 879.
73. Id.
74. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 320.
75. Id.
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ticularly the major powers upon which these interventions de-
pend."76 Professor Murphy confirms that the "schizophrenia"
among states may be caused by "lack of definition in the objectives
sought by humanitarian intervention."
With some restructuring and rewording of the UN Charter, clar-
ity problems and conflicting provision problems can be resolved.
While this certainly is not an exhaustive list of all of the clarity
problems that exist within the Charter, it is a focus on the provi-
sions from which most problems stem. A "cleaned-up" Charter
may provide some, albeit, not complete, reconciliation of the exist-
ing problem, and perhaps, even result in an increase of state sup-
port for humanitarian concerns.
B. The Legal Future
Without serious consideration for a "renewed" Charter, the UN
Security Council risks losing credibility, as its authorizations for
humanitarian interventions will continue to be criticized for their
inconsistencies." Some authorizations, such as the ones in Iraq
and Haiti, "gave credibility to the decisions of the Security Coun-
cil" because these were arguably more "humanitarian" in nature.78
However, the Security Council's actions in Somalia and Rwanda
were arguably "largely ineffective and not credible."79 The incon-
sistencies of the Security Council's actions, as a result of an un-
clear Charter, may infect the future credibility of the Security
Council in all areas, humanitarian or not. °
In order to avoid the problems with Security Council credibility,
perhaps a system of checks should be implemented. As of now,
there seems to have been few limitations on the Security Council's
actions, taken under Chapter VII.8 Far-fetched it may seem, but
the International Court of Justice perhaps could take a more ac-
76. Id. at 319-320.
77. Id. at 321.
78. Id.
79. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 321.
80. Id.
81. Lillich, supra note 35, at 12. Lillich discusses the Lockerbie case, (Libya v. UK,
Libya v. U.S. 1992 I.C.J. 3) in which Libya brought an action before the International Court
of Justice challenging the Security Council Resolution to authorize use force under its
Chapter VII power. Id. The International Court held that the Resolution "preempted its
jurisdiction." Id. Lillich goes on to say that "it is difficult to locate in the Charter substan-
tive limitations on the Council's actions taken under Chapter VII." Id. See also, W Mi-




tive role in standing check over the Security Council to ensure fu-
ture humanitarian interventions are within the scope of the Coun-
cil, as set forth in the Charter. The future of humanitarian inter-
vention, the Security Council, and the UN as a whole, rests on de-
veloping some consistency among actions, and striking a balance
between sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. Whether or
not the suggested solutions will ever manifest themselves rests
only in the hands of the UN and its members; therefore, we can
only speculate on the future of the legal status of UN involvement
in humanitarian affairs of states.
The notion of sovereignty is certainly established as a norm in
international law and it is easy to see that states hold their sover-
eignty in the highest regard. Although the UN Charter does estab-
lish sovereignty as being practically "absolute," it does also recog-
nize several times over, the importance of human rights protec-
tions. There is a trend, as we can see with the four case studies of
the 1990's, moving toward striking a balance between sovereignty
and UN humanitarian intervention.
The future will see the elimination of all "absolutes" - absolute
sovereignty and the absolute right to intervene - from the debate.
As we inch toward the center of the table, between sovereignty
and intervention, we see that perhaps we are effectuating the true
intent of the framers of the Charter. When the Charter was
drafted, in the shadow of World War II, the goal was two-fold: to
promote international peace and to prevent further atrocities as
those that happened in the World Wars.82 In searching for that
middle ground, Members should often remind themselves of the
framers' intent.
A balancing test has been proposed by author and Princeton In-
ternational Law Professor Richard Falk who believes the best way
to determine what constitutes humanitarian intervention and
when intervention is permissible, is to use somewhat of a sliding
scale. He states that there is a "legal and moral requirement" to
intervene and that, when such atrocities occur, state sovereignty
needs to be severely restricted and intervention becomes a neces-
sity.' He adds that when mass suffering and atrocities occur, the
82. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 66. See also supra notes 3 and 8 and accompanying texts.
83. Richard Falk, The Complexities of Humanitarian Intervention: A New World Order
Challenge, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 491, 503 (1996).
84. Id.
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sovereign status of a state ceases;8' therefore, sovereignty cannot
be violated by UN humanitarian ventures.
As far as the future of enforcing these humanitarian concerns,
the "loss" of sovereignty may be by far the best enforcement
mechanism. The balance may be a tough one to strike but middle
ground will be found -- the balancing proposition is one that the
framers of the Charter would absolutely endorse. This proposition
rings true in the words of Secretary General Kofi A. Annan as he
confirms that the UN Charter was made to "protect individual
human beings, not those who abuse them."86
IV. CONCLUSION
The UN Charter, with its inception in 1945, came about to form
an organization to promote international peace and security, and
to avoid a third World War. The Charter provides for both the
utmost respect for state sovereignty, as well as protection from
human rights violations. There are conflicts and clarity problems
within the Charter, which have led states to question the credibil-
ity of the Security Council and its role to authorize humanitarian
interventions. Resolving the conflicts within the Charter will pro-
vide some help in determining the future of the legality of UN ac-
tion. "International lawyers and policymakers must strive to im-
prove the ability of the UN, under the auspices of its Charter, to
undertake or authorize states to undertake such intervention.8 7
The legal debate over whether the UN can interfere into state
integrity to resolve human rights violations is a topic that will ex-
ist well into the future. The future holds a balance between state
sovereignty and humanitarian interventions; however, there will
always be, no matter what the proposed remedy, those who are
strictly opposed to UN intervention and those who advocate UN
intervention. As the debate continues, it is most important that
the main focus, rests not on personal opinion, but rather, on the
legality of the issue and the UN Charter's true purpose - a world
with respect for both sovereignty and human rights.
Jennifer L. Czernecki
85. Id.
86. Kofi A. Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, (THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1999),
available at http://www.un.org/Overview/SG/kaecon.htm. Annan declares, "When we read
the Charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual
human beings, not to protect those who abuse them." Id.
87. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 321.
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